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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's order denying Mr. Michael T. Hayes's motion 
to reconsider the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. General Course of Proceedings in this and Related Cases 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
In 2002, Mr. Hayes was friends with Nat and Megan, who lived in Shoshone County with 
Megan's daughters - fifteen-year-old T.L. and fourteen-year-old F.R. Tr. Vol. 1 (30591) 1 p. 54, 
In. 15 - p. 55, In. 7; p. 56, ln. 2-9; p. 156, ln. 3-8; p. 346, In. 13 - p. 347, In. 9. On approximately 
September 2, 2002, T.L. decided to run away from home because she was mad at her parents for 
reprimanding her for staying out all night. Id. at p. 67, In. 1 - p. 68, ln. 16; p. 97, ln. 15 - p. 98, 
ln. 6; p. 193, ln. 2 - p. 194, ln. 12; p. 307, ln. 15 - p. 308, ln. 5. With the assistance of her friend, 
T.L. stole her parents' vehicle in the dead of night and went to Mr. Hayes's residence to request 
money to run away to Wyoming. Id. at p. 195, ln. 4 - 18; p. 309, ln. 3 - p. 310, ln. 25; p. 331, ln. 
17 - p. 332, ln. 16. Mr. Hayes refused to give the girls money to run away and, instead, escorted 
Nat and Megan's vehicle back to their house. Id. at p. 201, In. 22 - p. 202, ln. 9; p. 318, ln. 5-24. 
1 On January 12, 2012, this Court took judicial notice of the appellate record and 
transcripts of the appeal from the denial of Mr. Hayes' s petition for post-conviction relief -
Docket Number 36637 - and ordered that the appellate record in this case not duplicate any 
documents in the previous appeal. In Docket Number 36637, this Court took judicial notice of 
records in related appeals, including the denial of Mr. Hayes's motion for a new trial in Shoshone 
County, Docket No. 35482, and the record and transcripts on direct appeal in Shoshone County, 
Docket No. 30591. See R. Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 384. Mr. Hayes is therefore contemporaneously 
filing a request for judicial notice asking this Court to consider the jury trial transcript in Mr. 
Hayes's direct appeal, Docket Number 30591. In this Brief, citations to the record and 
transcripts include the relevant docket number. 
T.L. was unhappy with Mr. Hayes for not giving her money to run away to Wyoming. Id. at p. 
282, In. 5-13. Instead of going home, T.L. stayed with her friend who was house-sitting for a 
family that was out of town. Id. at p. 199, In. 8-22. 
After learning that her mother had reported her as a runaway and fearing she would be in 
trouble upon going home, T.L. called dispatch and reported that Nat had been sexually abusing 
her. Id. at p. 199, In. 15 - p. 200, In. 7; p. 240, ln. 10- p. 241, In. 24. T.L. indicated that the 
abuse began when she was eight or nine years of age and included a number of sexual acts, 
including giving her father oral sex. Id. at p. 260, In. 5 - p. 264, In. 14. In addition to detailed 
accounts of sexual abuse, T.L. reported that her father had injected her with cocaine. Id. at p. 
242, ln. 10 - p. 252, ln. 5; p. 260, ln. 5 - p. 264, ln. 15. Nat has hepatitis C. Id. at p. 239, In. 12-
13. Tests confirmed that T.L., like Nat, had hepatitis C. Id. at p. 239, In. 7-11. Based on her 
disclosures of Nat's abuse, T.L. was declared to be in imminent danger and was placed into a 
foster home. Id. at p. 463, ln. 19 - p. 464, ln. 2. T.L. disliked foster care and wanted to return to 
her parents' home. Id. at p. 272, ln. 13-24; p. 468, ln. 17-25. 
T.L. therefore indicated that she had lied about Nat sexually abusing her and instead 
claimed that it was actually Mr. Hayes who sexually abused her and had shot her up with drugs. 
Id. at p. 267, ln. 1 - p. 268, ln. 4; p. 481, ln. 18 - p. 485, ln. 2. T.L. reported a series of alleged 
sexual encounters with Mr. Hayes over the summer of 2002, including alleged encounters during 
a camping trip in Kootenai County over the Fourth of July weekend. Id. at p. 491, In. 2 - p. 495, 
In. 2. After T.L. changed her story and implicated Mr. Hayes, the detective obtained a warrant 
authorizing him to seize a sample of Mr. Hayes's blood to determine whether he had hepatitis C. 
Id. at p. 485, ln. 10-14; p. 487, ln. 5-14. The test revealed that Mr. Hayes did not have hepatitis 
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C at that time and the detective did not seek any further testing. Id. at p. 488, In. 12-17. 
The state charged Mr. Hayes in Kootenai County with four counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor under the age of sixteen, one count for each day of the camping trip over the Fourth of July 
weekend. State v. Hayes, Docket Nos. 30574 and 30591, p. 3 (Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006) 
(unpublished)("Hayes I"). The state charged Mr. Hayes in Shoshone County with one count of 
lewd conduct with a minor on September 2, 2002, which allegedly occurred after T.L. came to 
his house looking for money to run away. See id. The state moved to join the Kootenai and 
Shoshone County cases and the cases were joined for trial. Hayes I, Docket Nos. 30574 and 
30591, p. 3. Mr. Hayes was appointed counsel in each case - herein referred to as Shoshone 
County counsel and Kootenai County counsel or, collectively, "trial counsel." 
During trial, the state presented evidence to the jury that T.L. claimed to have contracted 
hepatitis C because her boyfriend held her down and shot her up with drugs. Tr. Vol. 3 (30591) 
p. 134, In. 14-22. The defense also elicited T.L.' s detailed description through a detective of an 
occasion when Mr. Hayes supposedly shot her full of drugs. See id. at p. 481, In. 11 - p. 491, In. 
6. To exclude Mr. Hayes as the source ofT.L.'s hepatitis and to refute her claim that he injected 
her with drugs, trial counsel relied entirely on the testimony of the investigating detective and the 
report generated from the blood test conducted pursuant to the warrant. See Tr. Vol. 3 (30591) p. 
488, ln. 5-12. Rather than testify that Mr. Hayes does not have hepatitis C as counsel expected, 
the detective testified that Mr. Hayes should be re-tested because one test could not establish 
whether a person actually has hepatitis C. Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 176, ln. 17-24. 
During closing arguments at trial, Shoshone County counsel argued that both T.L. and 
Nat have hepatitis C, whereas Mr. Hayes does not. See id. at p. 555, In. 7 - p. 556, In. 2. Counsel 
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thus argued that the initial allegations of abuse by T.L. 's father were true and the claims of abuse 
by Mr. Hayes were false. Id. When counsel argued that Mr. Hayes "doesn't have hepatitis C" 
the state objected, asserting "that's not in evidence." Id. at p. 555, In. 17-20. Then, in rebuttal, 
the state began by arguing: 
[Counsel] talked to you about the fact that [T.L.] has hepatitis C. And, 
frankly, we don't know how [T.L.] got hepatitis C. We don't know whether or 
not it was from sharing the same razor that her mother and father used or being in 
a womb with a person who has hepatitis C, her mother. We don't know how she 
got it. 
But what we also don't know is whether or not Mr. Hayes has hepatitis C 
or not. We don't know that. We know that [the detective] had an initial report 
that said that he didn't have hepatitis ... C, and probably didn't have hepatitis C 
but he needed to get that confirmed. And that's it. You don't have any other 
evidence. You don't have some doctor coming in here and saying, "Mr. Hayes 
doesn't have hepatitis C." So, frankly, that's not true. We don't know whether or 
not Mr. Hayes has hepatitis C. 
Id. at p. 575, In. 10 - p. 576, In. 1. 
Of the Kootenai County charges, the jury acquitted Mr. Hayes on count one - the 
allegation concerning July 4 - and was unable to reach a verdict on counts two and four - the 
allegations concerning July 5 and 7. Hayes I, Docket No. 30591, p. 4. However, the jury found 
Mr. Hayes guilty of count three of the Kootenai County counts, concerning the allegation of lewd 
conduct on July 6, and guilty of the Shoshone County charge. Id. The district court imposed 
concurrent unified forty-year sentences with minimum terms of twenty years. Id. On direct 
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Hayes's convictions. Id. at p. 10. 
2. Kootenai County Motion for New Trial 
Before trial, Mr. Hayes's attorney was unable to locate and contact Thomas Pratt, who 
had been present during the Fourth of July camping trip in Kootenai County. State v. Hayes, 144 
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Idaho 574,576, 165 P.3d 288,290 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Hayes IF'). After the trial, Mr. Hayes 
located Tom in Connecticut and moved the court for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence. Id. at 576-77, 165 P.3d at 290-91. In support of his new trial motion, Mr. Hayes 
submitted Tom's affidavit, in which he stated that he had been with Mr. Hayes "during two of the 
times when T.L. had testified that the sexual acts occurred, including the alleged incident on July 
6, and that the alleged offenses never occurred." Id. at 577, 165 P.3d at 291. 
The district court determined that the affidavit constituted newly discovered, material 
evidence that had been unavailable at trial, despite diligent efforts on the part of the defense. 
However, the district court concluded there was no probability that the new evidence would 
produce an acquittal and denied Mr. Hayes's motion for a new trial. Id. Mr. Hayes appealed and 
on May 22, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed. Id. 
After affirming that Tom's testimony was newly discovered, material evidence and that 
Mr. Hayes demonstrated diligent efforts to find the witness before trial, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the district court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. Id. at 578-79, 165 
P.3d at 292-93. The Court reasoned: 
Given the significance of Pratt's testimony directly controverting the allegations 
of an offense on July 6, the fact that T.L.'s mother's testimony also contradicted 
T.L.'s claims as to that date, the evidence calling into question T.L.'s general 
veracity, and the jury's apparent distrust of much of T.L. 's story, we conclude that 
the district court erred in determining that the addition of Pratt's testimony at a 
new trial would not probably produce an acquittal on the count for which Hayes 
now stands convicted. 
Id. at 580, 165 P.3d at 294. 
On remand, the state elected not to re-try Mr. Hayes on the Kootenai County charges. See 
R. Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 356-57. 
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3. Shoshone County Motion for New Trial 
Mr. Hayes had also filed a motion for a new trial in Shoshone County based on Tom's 
testimony, which the district court stayed pending the outcome of Mr. Hayes's motion in 
Kootenai County and was renewed after the Court of Appeals reversed in Hayes II. Id. The 
district court determined that Tom's testimony constituted newly discovered, material evidence 
that had been unavailable at trial despite diligent efforts on the part of the defense but denied the 
motion finding there was no probability the new evidence would produce an acquittal in the 
Shoshone County case. State v. Hayes, Docket No. 35482 (Ct. App. Feb. 17,2010) 
(unpublished) ("Hayes III"). On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Tom's testimony primarily refuted the Kootenai 
County charges and that the use of Tom's testimony would not probably produce an acquittal in 
the Shoshone County case. Id. 
4. Post-conviction proceedings 
On October 23, 2006, Mr. Hayes filed a prose application for post-conviction relief 
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing in both the 
Shoshone and Kootenai County cases. R. Vol. 1 (36637) pg. 1-29. After the state elected not to 
re-try the Kootenai County charges and the district court denied the motion for a new trial in 
Shoshone County, Mr. Hayes amended his application for post-conviction relief. See R. Vol. 2 
(36637) pg. 214-25. Mr. Hayes alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
for various reasons, including counsel's failure to call witnesses who could have confirmed that 
Mr. Hayes does not have hepatitis C. R. Vol. 2 (36637), pg. 243. Mr. Hayes also alleged that 
trial counsel failed to request a continuance based on his medical condition and failed to expose 
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perjury or object to prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 243-45. 
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 21, 2009. When Mr. Hayes was 
transported to the jail for his evidentiary hearing, the Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC") 
failed to return Mr. Hayes's legal materials, which he brought with him to assist in presenting his 
post-conviction case. Tr. Vol. 4 (3663 7) p. 13, In. 18 - p. 14, In. 14. The district court did not 
order that IDOC return the materials until the day of the evidentiary hearing and Mr. Hayes was 
thus deprived of those materials during the hearing. Id. 
After IDOC returned Mr. Hayes's documents, he moved the district court to augment the 
record with exhibits unavailable to him at the time of the hearing. R. Vol. 2 (3663 7) pg. 352-56. 
Although Mr. Hayes mailed his motion, affidavit and exhibits before the district court issued its 
decision, the district court did not receive the materials until the day after it issued its 
memorandum opinion denying Mr. Hayes's application for post-conviction relief. Compare id. 
at pg. 352 and 355 with pg. 356. Mr. Hayes thereafter filed a motion to reconsider, arguing why 
the wrongfully withheld materials demonstrated that the district court's opinion was in error. Id. 
at pg. 391-94. The district court did not rule on either Mr. Hayes's motion to augment or to 
reconsider. 
On appeal from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Hayes raised 
several issues, including arguing that the district court's error in failing to rule on Mr. Hayes's 
motions to augment and reconsider required reversal. The Court of Appeals declined to consider 
this issue because the district court had not ruled on Mr. Hayes's motion and thus, there was no 
"adverse ruling" to consider on appeal. Hayes v. State, Docket No. 36637, p. 10 (Court of 
Appeals, April 22, 201 l)(unpublished) ("Hayes IV"). On October 17, 2011, Mr. Hayes filed a 
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"Motion to Expedite Ruling on Motion to Amend and Reconsider Memorandum Opinion Order 
Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R. (39543) p. 19-20. On November 2, 2011, the district 
court entered an order denying Mr. Hayes's motion to reconsider. Id. at 25-31. This appeal 
follows. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hayes's motion to reconsider the 
denial of his application for post-conviction relief? 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS DENIAL OF MR. HAYES'S POST-CONVICTION 
APPLICATION AFTER HE SUBMITTED ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS THAT WERE 
WRONGFULLY TAKEN BY PRISON AUTHORITIES 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party from a final 
judgment or order for any "reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(6). The district court may exercise its discretion in granting a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) 
upon a showing of unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 
731, 736, 228 P.3d 998, 1003 (201 O); Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 36, 592 P.2d 849, 
851 (1979). In Eby, the Court expanded the circumstances in which Rule 60(b )(6) relief can be 
granted in post-conviction relief actions because: 
we are ... cognizant that the Unifonn Post-Conviction Procedure Act is "the 
exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence" other than 
by direct appeal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215,217,220 P.3d 571, 573 (2009) 
(quoting Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 519, 975 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
Given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, and given the complete 
absence of meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby to 
advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence, we conclude that 
this case may present the "unique and compelling circumstances" in which I.R.C.P. 
60(b )( 6) relief may well be warranted. 
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Eby, 148 Idaho at 737,228 P.3d at 1004. Indeed, "failing to provide a post-conviction applicant 
with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due 
process." Schwartzv. State, 145 Idaho 186,189,177 P.3d400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), citing 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Abbott v. 
State, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996); Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 
35, 740 P.2d 73, 77 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring). 
Here, IDOC deprived Mr. Hayes of critical documents he had intended to use during the 
evidentiary hearing and, within a reasonable amount of time following IDOC' s return of those 
documents, Mr. Hayes asked the district court to consider them in support of his post-conviction 
relief petition. Unfortunately, Mr. Hayes's motion and the district court's opinion crossed in the 
mail and the district court received Mr. Hayes's motion and exhibits after it had already denied his 
petition. When Mr. Hayes realized that his motion to augment had not reached the district court 
before its ruling, he asked the district court to reconsider its ruling in light of the evidence 
unavailable to him during the hearing due to IDOC's actions. These circumstances present unique 
and compelling circumstances warranting reconsideration. 
The district court found there were no unique and compelling circumstances because Mr. 
Hayes's motion to augment was untimely instead ofrecognizing that IDOC's actions prevented 
Mr. Hayes from submitting the additional materials to the district court at an earlier date. Further, 
Mr. Hayes intended to utilize the documents of which he was deprived to support his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, to support his 
claim that he was incapacitated during trial as a result of his post-operative status, to impeach his 
attorneys' testimony and to utilize medical records to support his claim that he was incapacitated 
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during the jury trial. The district court failed to recognize the significance of the additional 
exhibits and erroneously concluded that they "would not alter the order denying [Mr. Hayes'] 
request for post-conviction relief." R. (39543) pg 29. 
IDOC's actions, which prevented Mr. Hayes from utilizing critical documents during the 
evidentiary hearing, in combination with the district court's failure to provide any relief from its 
order denying post-conviction relief, constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of Mr. Hayes' s 
due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. Accordingly, 
the district court abused its discretion in failing to recognize the unique and compelling 
circumstances that warrant relieving Mr. Hayes from the denial of his petition for post-conviction 
relief and this Court should reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Hayes's motion to 
reconsider and remand with instruction to grant Mr. Hayes post-conviction relief. 
A. Mr. Hayes Presented Unique and Compelling Circumstances Justifying 
Reconsideration of the Order Denying His Post-Conviction Application 
When Mr. Hayes was transported to the Shoshone County Jail before the evidentiary 
hearing, IDOC refused to allow him access to the box of legal materials that he had prepared to 
assist him during the hearing. R. Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 300; Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 13, In. 24 - p. 14, 
In. 14. Although Mr. Hayes filed a motion to return his documents a week before the hearing, 
those materials still had not been returned to him the day of the evidentiary hearing and he was 
required to proceed without their benefit. Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 14, In. 2-5. That same day, the 
district court ordered that the IDOC return Mr. Hayes' s legal materials to him. R. Vol. 2 (3663 7) 
pg. 336; Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 14, In. 15-19. 
IDOC did not return Mr. Hayes's legal materials until May 12, 2009. R. Vol. 2 (36637) 
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pg. 353, 403. On June 4, 2009, Mr. Hayes provided a pro sc motion for augmentation and 
supporting affidavit to prison authorities for filing with the district court in which he asked the 
court to consider various materials that had been deprived from him prior to the evidentiary 
hearing. See R. Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 355,417. The district court did not receive Mr. Hayes's 
motion and affidavit until June 10, 2009, which was one day after the district court issued its 
memorandum opinion and order denying Mr. Hayes's application for post-conviction relief. See 
Id. atpg. 352,356,402. 
In his motion to amend and reconsider, which the district comi received on July 17, 2009, 
Mr. Hayes explained that he had filed his motion to augment pursuant to the prisoner mailbox 
rule, prior to the district court's decision. Id. at pg. 391-92. Mr. Hayes asked the district court to 
vacate and reconsider its prior ruling since it was made without the benefit of Mr. Hayes's motion 
to augment and related materials. Id. at pg. 393. The district court failed to rule on Mr. Hayes's 
motion until prompted to do so more than two years later. 
These circumstances reveal that Mr. Hayes diligently attempted to provide the district 
court with the pertinent exhibits. The district court failed to recognize those efforts, finding: 
Hayes, at the time of trial, knew that he had the evidence which is the basis of his 
motion. Hayes advised his counsel of the information prior to the trial. It was 
discussed at the commencement of the trial. No request was made to continue the 
trial so it could be presented. No request was made at the trial to augment the 
record with the proffered evidence. No such request was made in the post-trial 
briefs. While Hayes did make a pro se motion to augment the record after the trial, 
it was not timely. The decision denying the petition for post-conviction relief was 
entered approximately two months after the trial. Hayes appealed the decision 
denying post-conviction relief. His appellate counsel chose not to seek a stay of 
the appeal to have the motion decided. Hayes waited until after the appeal was 
decided to bring to the court's attention that the motion was being pursued. Under 
these circumstances there are no compelling reasons for granting the relief. A 
decision to grant the relief would be an abuse of discretion. 
1 1 
R. (39543) 28-29. 
Given Mr. Hayes's clear explanation as to when IDOC returned his exhibits, the district 
court's conclusion that Mr. Hayes should have submitted the exhibits at issue during the 
evidentiary hearing or post-trial trials is patently unfair. Indeed, according to the billing statement 
submitted by Mr. Hayes's post-conviction counsel, counsel finished work on the post-hearing 
brief on May 6, 2009, whereas Mr. Hayes' s materials were not returned to him until May 12. R. 
Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 341,353,403. Less than one month after having the box of materials returned 
to him, Mr. Hayes mailed a motion to augment the exhibits, along with his affidavit, attaching the 
relevant materials. Given the difficulties facing prisoners filing documents pro se,2 such as 
limited ability to make copies for mailing, this relatively short turn around was eminently 
reasonable. 
Moreover, Mr. Hayes filed his motion to augment the record with documents of which he 
had been deprived of during the evidentiary hearing prior to the district court's ruling on his post-
conviction application. Id. at pg. 352-55. Following receipt of the district court's order on his 
post-conviction application, Mr. Hayes informed the district court that he had filed his motion to 
augment under the prisoner mailbox rule3 before the opinion was issued and asked the district 
court to reconsider its decision based on the additional documents. 
2 The district court noted that Mr. Ifayes had been represented and thus questioned 
whether it was obligated to consider the motions to augment and reconsider. R. (39543) pg. 27, 
n.1. However, it is not clear whether counsel's appointment included post-judgment motions and 
whether his appointment continued after the SAPD was appointed June 16, 2009. 
3 Pursuant to the "mailbox rule," an inmate's documents are considered to be filed when 
they are delivered to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing to the court clerk. Hayes v. 
State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475,478 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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Finally, the district court was obligated to rule on Mr. Hayes's motion within a reasonable 
amount of time after it was filed and, thus, abused its discretion in finding no unique and 
compelling circumstances because Mr. Hayes "waited until after the appeal was decided to bring 
to the court's attention that the motion was being pursued." By definition, a motion is a request 
for an order and both Mr. Hayes's motions to augment and reconsider described the relief he was 
seeking. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, Th Edition, p. 826 (a "motion" is an "application 
requesting a court to make a specified ruling). It is thus unclear why Mr. Hayes was obligated to 
further inform the district court that he actually wanted the judge to rule on the relief described in 
his motions. 
The unlawful deprivation of Mr. Hayes's legal materials, in combination with his attempt 
to augment the record prior to issuance of the district court's order, justify providing relief from 
the denial of his post-conviction relief petition under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). To not recognize these 
circumstances as sufficiently compelling to allow reconsideration in light of the new exhibits 
deprives Mr. Hayes of his due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present his post-
conviction relief claims. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in failing to 
recognized the unique and compelling circumstances that warrant relieving Mr. Hayes from the 
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Recognize the Significance of 
the Additional Evidence Establishing that Mr. Hayes Has Never Had Hepatitis C and 
How that Evidence Established that He Was Entitled to Post-Conviction Relief 
With his motion to augment, Mr. Hayes submitted lab reports indicating that he was 
negative for hepatitis C, dated August of 1997, May of 2001, and July of2001; trial counsel's 
response to the Idaho State Bar following Mr. Hayes's ethical complaint; and a witness list signed 
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by trial counsel and served on the prosecutor. Exh. 6, 7.4 In concluding that these exhibits would 
not have altered its decision to deny post-conviction relief, the district court found: 
Exhibits 6 and 7 are offered to show that Hayes did not have hepatitis C. In the 
June 9, 2009 order the court found that Hayes's attorneys were not deficient in 
failing to produce additional evidence that he did not have hepatitis C. This 
finding was affirmed on appeal. 
R. (39543) pg. 29. 
However, as Mr. Hayes explained in the motion and affidavit asking the district court to augment 
the omitted exhibits, Exhibits 6 and 7 would have demonstrated far more than that Mr. Hayes did 
not have hepatitis C. Instead, these exhibits contradicted trial counsel's evidentiary hearing 
testimony by establishing that they knew Mr. Hayes had been independently tested for hepatitis C 
by his treating physicians and that this information was provided to the prosecutor in advance of 
trial. 
Accordingly, these exhibits demonstrate that the district court's basis for denying Mr. 
Hayes's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to establish that he 
does not have hepatitis C (and the Court of Appeals' basis for affirming that finding) was 
erroneous. The exhibits also establish that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 
arguments by arguing facts he knew to be false. After considering these exhibits in light of the 
testimony and record in the underlying criminal proceedings, the district court should have 
vacated its earlier decision denying post-conviction relief. 
4 While Mr. Hayes's motion to augment appears in Docket Number 36637, the affidavit 
and supporting exhibits were exhibits in that appeal and were returned to the district court. R. 
Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 430. Accordingly, Mr. Hayes is contemporaneously filing a motion to 
augment the record with those exhibits. 
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1. Significance of Hepatitis C evidence 
At the post-conviction hearing, both Shoshone and Kootenai County counsel testified that 
they believed that establishing Mr. Hayes does not have hepatitis C was minimally helpful 
because hepatitis C is transmitted by blood to blood contact instead of through sexual intercourse. 
Tr. Vol.4(36637)p.113,ln.11-p.114,ln.15;p.161,ln.4-23. ShoshoneCountycounselalso 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Hayes refused to provide him with the names of 
physicians who could testify that he did not have hepatitis C. Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 111, In. 4-23. 
Kootenai County counsel testified that Mr. Hayes never requested an independent test and that 
counsel did not see any reason for independent testing. Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 160, In. 14-19. 
In affirming the district court's decision to deny relief for trial counsel's failure to 
establish that Mr. Hayes did not have hepatitis C, the Court of Appeals reasoned: "the district 
court weighed the testimony of Hayes's attorney and determined that the decision of counsel not to 
further pursue the hepatitis C issue was strategic and tactical." Hayes JV, Docket No. 36637, at p. 
7. The district court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that Exhibits 6 and 7 directly 
refute these findings. 
In direct contradiction of Shoshone County counsel's testimony that Mr. Hayes refused to 
provide the names of his physicians, Exhibit 7 includes a witness list signed by Shoshone County 
counsel, which included the name of one of the physicians who had tested Mr. Hayes for hepatitis 
C. Compare Exh. 7, p. 3 (listing Dr. Deb Elliot-Pearson) with Exh. 6, p. 2-3 (lab reports initialed 
by DEP). Further, in Kootenai County counsel's response to the Idaho State Bar following Mr. 
Hayes's ethical complaint, counsel indicated that Mr. Hayes had an independent lab test after 
being charged that showed that he was negative for hepatitis C but that counsel did not attempt to 
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admit those results at trial because he did not re-issue a subpoena for the necessary witness. Exh. 
6, p. 9, 14. This statement is in direct contradiction to counsel's testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing in which he indicated that Mr. Hayes never requested an independent test and that counsel 
did not see any reason for independent testing. Tr. Vol. 4 (36637) p. 160, In. 14-19. 
The district court determined that the decision to forgo additional evidence that Mr. Hayes 
did not have hepatitis C was strategic without the benefit of the additional documentation that 
contradicted counsel's testimony explaining that strategic decision. The additional exhibits, of 
which Mr. Hayes was wrongfully deprived during the evidentiary hearing, were directly relevant 
to the basis of the district court's findings and the district court therefore abused its discretion in 
failing to reconsider its decision based on those exhibits. 
2. Exhibits 6 and 7 establish counsels' deficient performance in failing to 
introduce evidence that Mr. Hayes does not have hepatitis C during trial 
In denying post-conviction relief, the district court found that trial counsel was not 
obligated to retain an expert to testify how hepatitis C is transmitted and such evidence was not 
critical. R. (3663 7) Vol. 2 pg. 3 71. Actually, in post-conviction counsel's trial brief, Mr. Hayes 
argued that "the fact that Michael Hayes is hepatitis C negative was critical to an adequate 
defense" because it would have supported that T.L. had actually been abused by Nat, not Mr. 
Hayes. Trial Brief #3, p. 3-4.5 Mr. Hayes contended that "the rationales of defense counsel for 
not testing Mr. Hayes ... made no sense" and calling the detective "to testify as he did was 
inadequate representation." Id. at. 4. Mr. Hayes also clarified his argument in his augmentation 
materials, indicating that his own doctors could have testified that he did not have hepatitis C. 
5 Trial Brief 3 was augmented into Docket Number 36637 on May 14, 2010. 
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R. (36637) Vol. 2 pg. 400. 
Although trial counsel claimed during post-conviction relief proceedings that showing that 
Mr. Hayes did not have hepatitis C was unimportant, the jury trial proceedings establish that trial 
counsel actually attempted to show the jury that Mr. Hayes did not have hepatitis C to illustrate 
that she falsely accused Mr. Hayes to deflect attention away from her actual abuser, Nat and to 
discredit T.L.'s claim that Mr. Hayes injected her with drugs. See e.g. Tr. Vol. 3 (30591) p. 134, 
In. 14-22; p. 481, In. 11 - p. 491, In. 6; p. 510, In. 11 - p. 511, ln. 8. 
Trial counsel attempted to exclude Mr. lfayes as the source of T.L. 's hepatitis and to refute 
her claim that he injected her with drugs by relying entirely on the testimony of the investigating 
detective and the report generated from the blood test conducted pursuant to the warrant. See Tr. 
Vol. 3 (30591) p. 488, In. 5-12. Rather than testify that Mr. Hayes does not have hepatitis C as 
counsel expected, the detective testified that Mr. Hayes should be re-tested because one test could 
not establish whether a person actually has hepatitis C. Tr. Vol. 4 (36687) p. 176, In. 17-24. 
During closing arguments at trial, Shoshone County counsel argued that both T.L. and Nat 
have hepatitis C whereas Mr. Hayes does not. See id. at p. 555, In. 7 - p. 556, In. 2. Counsel thus 
argued that the initial allegations of abuse by T.L. 's father were true and the claims of abuse by 
Mr. Hayes were false. Id. However, because counsel attempted to establish that Mr. Hayes did 
not have hepatitis C through the detective, the prosecutor argued that no one knew whether Mr. 
Hayes had the disease. Id. at p. 575, ln. 10 - p. 576, In. 1. 
At the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction case, trial counsel admitted that he failed 
to recognize that the report from the blood test, about which he questioned the detective during 
trial, could be interpreted as inconclusive even though the report indicated that a negative result 
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"does not exclude the possibility of exposure to or infection with" hepatitis C. Tr. Vol. 4 (36687) 
p. 169, In. 14-p. 170, In. 6; 173, ln. 9-12; p. 178, In. 10-13; Exh. 4, (4-21-09). Counsel 
additionally admitted that he made the "unfortunate mistake" of not having his investigator 
interview the detective prior to trial and instead spoke with the detective himself. Tr. Vol. 4 
(36637) p. 176, In. 22-23. Thus, when the detective's answers to counsel's questions on the 
witness stand were different than those he gave during his interview with counsel prior to trial, 
counsel was unable to impeach him with his prior statements. Id. at p. 176, ln. 18-24. 
Exhibits 6 and 7 establish that trial counsel possessed lab reports verifying that Mr. Hayes 
did not have hepatitis C and that they had disclosed Mr. Hayes's medical provider, who had 
conducted that testing, as a witness. According to Kootenai County counsel's response to the bar 
complaint, the medical provider was not called because counsel did not re-issue the subpoena. 
There is no apparent tactical reason to attempt to introduce evidence that Mr. Hayes did 
not have hepatitis C through the detective's preliminary report when trial counsel could have 
simply subpoenaed Mr. Hayes treating medical provider to discuss pre-existing testing. Exhibits 6 
and 7 establish that trial counsel knew of a witnesses who could provide the necessary testimony 
and instead made the admittedly risky choice to rely on the detective. Further, although trial 
counsel testified during post-conviction proceedings that it was unimportant to establish that Mr. 
Hayes did not have hepatitis C, the jury trial proceedings reveal that whether Mr. Hayes had 
hepatitis C was heavily disputed and that definitive proof that Mr. Hayes did not have the disease 
would have resulted in a different outcome. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to appreciate the significance of the additional exhibits and in failing to reconsider its 
denial of post-conviction relief based on those exhibits. 
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3. Exhibits 6 and 7 establish that Mr. Hayes received ineffective assistance of 
counsel and was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct 
The lab reports combined with the witness list and trial counsel's statement that he had 
disclosed those reports to the prosecutor would have established that the prosecutor had actual 
knowledge that Mr. Hayes did not have hepatitis C. These materials thus establish that 
prosecutorial misconduct deprived Mr. Hayes of his federal due process right to a fair trial and 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the misconduct. See also R. (3663 7) 404-
06. 
When counsel argued that Mr. Hayes "doesn't have hepatitis C" the state objected, 
asserting "that's not in evidence." Id. at p. 555, In. 17-20. Then, in rebuttal, the state began by 
argumg: 
[Counsel] talked to you about the fact that [T.L.] has hepatitis C. And, 
frankly, we don't know how [T.L.] got hepatitis C. We don't know whether or not 
it was from sharing the same razor that her mother and father used or being in a 
womb with a person who has hepatitis C, her mother. We don't know how she got 
it. 
But what we also don't know is whether or not Mr. Hayes has hepatitis C or 
not. We don't know that. We know that [the detective] had an initial report that 
said that he didn't have hepatitis ... C, and probably didn't have hepatitis C but he 
needed to get that confirmed. And that's it. You don't have any other evidence. 
You don't have some doctor coming in here and saying, "Mr. Hayes doesn't have 
hepatitis C." So, frankly, that's not true. We don't know whether or not Mr. 
Hayes has hepatitis C. 
Id. at p. 575, ln. 10 - p. 576, ln. 1. 
The government's fundamental interest in criminal prosecutions is not to win a case but, 
rather, ensure that justice is done. United States v. Blue ford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2002); 
State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 322, 127 P.3d 212,225 (Ct. App. 2005). As the Ninth Circuit 
held: 
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[i]t is certainly within the bounds of fair advocacy for a prosecutor, like any 
lawyer, to ask the jury to draw inferences from the evidence that the prosecutor 
believes in good faith might be true. But it is decidedly improper for the 
government to propound inferences that it knows to be false, or has very strong 
reason to doubt. 
Blueford, 312 F.3d at 968. In Blueford, the prosecutor's actions in asking the jury to infer that the 
defendant fabricated his alibi in certain telephone calls with witnesses in the weeks just before the 
trial, when in fact the government had evidence contradicting some of its assertions, required a 
new trial. Id. at 963-64. 
Similarly, although the defense neglected to call a witness who could testify about the 
additional negative hepatitis C tests, the prosecutor had those reports in his possession. The 
prosecutor nevertheless argued to the jury that it was "not true" that "we don't know whether or 
not Mr. Hayes has hepatitis C." Tr. Vol. 1 (30591) p. 575, ln. 10 - p. 576, ln. 1. The difference 
between a lawyer asking the jury to infer facts that he believed in good faith might be true and 
making factual assertions he well knows are untrue reflects the difference between fair advocacy 
and misconduct. See Blueford, 312 F.3d at 968. 
Given that the prosecution had been provided multiple lab reports demonstrating that Mr. 
Hayes was not positive for hepatitis C, the prosecutor could not have entertained a good faith 
belief that it was actually unknown whether Mr. Hayes had hepatitis C, regardless of whether his 
argument accurately reflected the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the prosecutor's argument 
constituted misconduct and trial counsel rendered deficient performance in neglecting to object. 
Without his copies of the lab reports and counsel's statement to the bar indicating he had provided 
lab reports to the prosecution, Mr. Hayes was unable to prove this claim. 
The unlawful seizure of Mr. Hayes's legal materials thus deprived him of his due process 
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right to a meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. The district court abused 
its discretion by not curing the constitutional defect and vacating the denial of his post-conviction 
relief petition after reconsidering his claims in light of the additional evidence. 
C. Mr. Hayes Was Deprived of His Opportunity to Support His Claim that Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing to Request a Continuance 
With his affidavit in support of his motion to augment, Mr. Hayes attached an operative 
report dated August 21, 2003, describing his back surgery and order for home health dated August 
23, 2003, which indicated that Mr. Hayes would require assistance with all activities of daily 
living. Exh. 5, p. 3. Mr. Hayes also submitted documentation of prescriptions for the medications 
prescribed following surgery, which Mr. Hayes testified at the evidentiary hearing caused him to 
feel extremely drowsy and unable to function during the jury trial. Id. at p. 5-9. 
Mr. Hayes explained that he had intended to use these documents to support his claim that 
pain and the effects of medication rendered him incapacitated during his jury trial. In denying this 
claim, the district court relied on counsels' testimony that they did not observe any concentration 
problems and concluded that Mr. Hayes failed to meet his burden of persuasion. R. Vol. 2 
(36637) pg. 370. The aforementioned medical records would have supported Mr. Hayes's claim 
by providing objective evidence that verified his condition and the medication he had been taking. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hayes was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to prove his claim that trial 
counsel should have moved to continue the trial as a result of his medical condition. 
In concluding that this evidence would not have altered its decision to deny post-
conviction relief, the district court found that: 
Exhibit 5 is offered to show that Hayes was under post-operative care and 
was taking medications at the time of trial of the criminal case. Whether Hayes 
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was taking medication was not an issue. The issue was whether his attorneys were 
deficient in not requesting a continuance because of his medical condition. 
Consideration of exhibit 5 does not change the fact that Hayes's attorneys, and the 
court, did not notice any problems from Hayes's medication, and he failed to 
inform his attorneys of any problems from his medication. 
R. (39543) 29. 
However, evidence of the exact nature of the medications Mr. Hayes was taking and the 
level of after-care he needed should have caused the district court to reconsider its prior ruling. 
Indeed, Exhibit 5 establishes that Mr. Hayes must have been impacted by the medications and 
post-operative care and, therefore, the court and counsel must be incorrect in believing Mr. Hayes 
did not exhibit any difiiculty paying attention during trial. 
Further, the district court failed to recognize how the exhibits impeaching trial counsel's 
testimony would have assisted this claim. In rejecting Mr. Hayes's claims that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a continuance based on Mr. Hayes' s medical condition and failing 
to call Mr. Hayes as a witness, the district court determined that the attorneys' testimony was 
more credible than that of Mr. Hayes. R. Vol. 2 (36637) pg. 370. Shoshone County counsel's 
witness list and Kootenai County counsel's response to the Bar could have been utilized to 
impeach the attorneys' credibility or their ability to accurately recall the events at issue. Such an 
examination could have led the district court to make different credibility determinations, thus 
resulting in Mr. Hayes being granted relief on his claim that counsel prevented him from 
testifying. Additionally, the ability to properly cross-examine counsel, in combination with the 
additional medical and medication records regarding Mr. Hayes's surgery, could have led the 
district court to find in Mr. Hayes's favor on his claim that counsel should have moved to 
continue the trial based on his medical condition. The district court therefore abused its discretion 
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in failing to reconsider its decision based on the exhibits submitted by Mr. Hayes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
IDOC deprived Mr. Hayes of critical documents he had intended to use during the 
evidentiary hearing and, within a reasonable amount of time following IDOC' s return of those 
documents, Mr. Hayes asked the district court to consider them in support of his post-conviction 
relief petition. When Mr. Hayes realized that his motion to augment had not reached the district 
court before its ruling, he asked the district court to reconsider its ruling in light of the evidence 
unavailable to him during the hearing due to IDOC's actions. IDOC's wrongful act in taking Mr. 
Hayes's materials, combined with his diligent efforts to provide those documents to the district 
court, present unique and compelling circumstances warranting reconsideration. 
Moreover, the additional exhibits establish that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
establishing that Mr. Hayes is negative for hepatitis C through his medical provider and contradict 
the reasons counsel gave during post-conviction proceedings to explain why such evidence was 
offered. These exhibits also establish that Mr. Hayes is entitled to post-conviction relief by 
demonstrating that the prosecutor knew Mr. Hayes did not have hepatitis C and corroborating his 
statements regarding his medical condition during trial. 
IDOC' s actions, which prevented Mr. Hayes from utilizing critical documents during the 
evidentiary hearing, in combination with the district court's failure to provide any relief from its 
order denying post-conviction relief, constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of Mr. Hayes's 
due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Hayes respectfully asks this Courl to reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to reconsider and to remand this case to the district court with instruction to 
grant Mr. Hayes post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted this/ '1 day of August, 2012. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
y: Robyn Fyffe 
Attorneys for Michael T. Hayes 
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